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That there is a crisis is doubted by no one. The talented economist Stanislav Shatalin 
put it well in his speech to the February plenum of the Central Committee of the party: 
"It is not a question of saving socialism, communism or any other -ism. It is a question of 
saving our country, our people." It is also very much a question of the survival of the 
communist party itself, as well as of the Soviet Union, over which it has ruled for 
seventy years.
There are at least three elements in the crisis, which, though interconnected, can be 
distinguished: ideological, national and military, and economic.
Ideology
Take ideology first—Stalin killed most of the true believers. Exceptionally, Khrushchev 
retained a simple belief in the inherent superiority of the socialist system, in its ability to 
outgrow and outproduce the United States, and even looked forward to introducing the 
first stages to communism by 1980, when the USSR would (he thought) have forged 
ahead. Khrushchev was replaced by gray, dull, aged, and corruptible bureaucrats. 
Under Brezhnev, stability degenerated into immobility, and there was visibly developing 
a crisis of system, of belief in its ability to cope with the problem of maintaining 
dynamism, of not falling further behind in the technological revolution. The huge cost of 
the arms race, hidden by false statistics, was in itself a major cause of overstrain. Even 
the conservative majority in the top leadership could see that radical reform was 
1
inescapable, and they (no doubt unwillingly, and by a narrow majority) elected 
Gorbachev.
At first Gorbachev could speak of going "back to Lenin," of the need for "more 
Socialism." By 1987 he was outspoken in his criticism of the Stalin despotism, and the 
process began of rehabilitating those victims of the Stalin terror (such as Bukharin, 
Rykov, Zinov 'yev) who had remained "unpersons" until then. However, glasnost' 
advanced beyond the limits previously imposed. By 1989 almost everything could be 
said, published, discussed on television and in the remarkably open debates in the 
Supreme Soviet. The Stalin terror could be said (by Tsipko, in a series of articles first in 
Nauka i Zhizn', then in Sobesednik) to have been "the responsibility and tragedy of 
Bolshevism," and Stalin's views largely derived from those of Marx and Lenin; the 
October revolution was in fact reactionary, destroying freedom and destroying also the 
rising class of peasant proprietors. Of course, others disagreed, stressing that Stalin 
was not the executor of Lenin's will, but rather the executioner of Lenin's comrades. But 
many voices were raised, especially in 1990, to the effect that Marx was fundamentally 
mistaken in his view of socialism and of the market, that he did (he did!) envisage "labor 
armies, especially in agriculture" (Pantin and Plirnak in the Party's own Kommunist, No.
4, 1990),that he and Engels had no understanding of the problems of work motivation or 
indeed of planning, that they were wrong about the State, and that the Bolsheviks were 
wrong to dismiss the Constituent Assembly in 1918, wrong to kill the Tsar and his family.
Attacks on Lenin
Novy mir (No. 3, 1990) printed Ivan Bunin's harsh words, written seventy years ago, 
about the "criminals" Lenin, Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky. Numerous publicists (for instance the 
neo-liberal Selyunin, but also the Slavophil conservative Soloukhin) began to assert 
publicly that Lenin had forced Russia onto the wrong road, a road that was now a cul-
de-sac. Those ideas were reinforced by the publication of Solzhenitsyn's works, as well 
as of articles by and interviews with Western "Sovietologists" of various views: 
Conquest, Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Pipes, Stephen Cohen, Tucker, myself. Hayek's 
Road to Serfdom has been quoted too. East European radical reformers are frequently 
2
cited. So the entire legitimacy of the Soviet system has been publicly put into question, 
and the legitimacy of doing this has been formally recognized by the abandonment, 
after seventy years, of the monopoly of the communist party. It is losing members, at all 
levels.
The party has lost popularity, purpose, the ability to get its orders obeyed. Alternatives 
seem many, but they are confused, contradictory, diffuse. Russian nationalism of 
offensive and neo-fascist anti-semitic species, Russian nationalists of much milder and 
more tolerant kinds, Social-Democratic, Socialist, "Kadet," monarchist, even 
AnarchoSyndicalist groups try to present their programs. Moscow (under G. Popov) and 
Leningrad (under Sobchak) have elected local Soviets of a radical-reformist kind, but 
this is as yet not typical of the provinces, and in any case the Soviets have not yet 
devised a power apparatus which can implement decisions. A power vacuum threatens.
Nationalism and the Military
Which brings me to nationalisms and to the military situation (and the situation of the 
military). The crisis of "ideological" confidence had a profound influence in deciding the 
Soviet leadership to abandon further attempts to retain control over what were once its 
satellites. The Afghan intervention was abandoned, the decision to intervene 
unequivocally condemned. There was a complete transformation of policies toward and 
attitudes to the West, to NATO, to America, and to the Third World too. Support for 
overseas countries with a so-called socialist orientation has been sharply criticized, 
overseas aid diminished. A satirical article by Ye. Ambartsumov in Moskovskie novosti of 
August 19, 1990 refers to what could well have been Moscow's reaction to the Iraq 
crisis; he makes up a likely TASS despatch reading: "The entire Soviet people 
wholeheartedly welcomes the victory of the socialist revolution over the rotten 
monarchist Kuwaiti regime, and expresses class solidarity with socialist Iraq for its 
generous internationalist assistance to the people of Kuwait. . ." (and so forth) . 
Ambartsumov ends with the words: "How pleasant it is to note that all this is ended for 
ever."
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However, the Soviet military establishment cannot be pleased with the cuts in men and 
weapons, and with what must seem to them an ignominious retreat from Central 
Europe. Officers suffer from low pay and lack of tolerable quarters and many have been 
upset by the fall in esteem of the armed forces and by press criticism of the harsh 
treatment of conscript soldiers. Voices are heard urging the "depolitization" of both the 
armed forces and the KGB. The former major-general of the KGB, Kalugin, went public 
in his criticism of that organization, and after protesting his dismissal got himself elected 
to the Supreme Soviet with a big majority.
But military men, policemen too, are supposed to serve in the name of something: an 
idea, a nation. The "idea" has faded away, and the USSR is a multitude of nations. 
Russian nationalism, strong among army officers, is an irritant to other nationalities in a 
multinational state, and so can act as a disuniting factor (unlike Polish or Hungarian 
nationalism in their respective communities).
It is unnecessary to dwell on the much-publicized facts about nationalist-secessionism 
and interethnic conflicts, affecting the three Baltic republics, Moldavia, Armenia, 
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia. There is tension too in the Ukraine, and even the Tatar 
autonomous republic wants independence. Some declare sovereignty, erect what are in 
effect customs and immigration barriers, speak of their own armed forces, currency, 
police, diplomatic representation. Hundreds of thousands have become refugees: 
Russians fleeing from some of the Islamic republics, Armenians from Azerbaidzhan, 
Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan. . . Yel'tsin declares the sovereignty of the Russian 
republic (RSFSR), and negotiates with Gorbachev as an equal. The communist party's 
loss of power is paralleled by the loss of authority of the central government, including 
the presidency. All this has been exacerbated by, and has contributed to, economic 
disruption.
The Economy
Which brings me to the economy. Again, the facts are beyond dispute. The centralized 
system was malfunctioning, and had entered a period of stagnation. Gorbachev desired 
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to give it dynamism through radical reform. However, in the period 1985-89 the reform 
process proceeded in a contradictory and half-hearted manner. Of course, one should 
not underestimate the huge practical problems involved. Even if everyone were agreed 
as to what to do, even if there were no opposition, a shift from the old to a new market-
based system would have been a very difficult one: human psychology, old ideological 
stereotypes, lack of experience, lack of the institutional infrastructure and of market 
intermediaries, lack also of popular support and understanding, these were all serious 
obstacles. The government made it all much worse by tolerating a growing budget 
deficit, postponing long-needed increases in highly subsidized prices, in effect printing 
far too much money, while loosening control over incomes and over enterprise 
spending. The ruble became discredited as a currency. The old system was being 
dismantled, but a new "market" system could not emerge amid growing shortages and 
confusion. Planned allocation is being replaced not by a market but by a multitude of 
bilateral barter deals between enterprises, territories, cities. Favorable weather has 
contributed to a record harvest in 1990, but lack of labor, machines, fuel, storage space, 
transport, cause unusually heavy losses. Citizens queue for cigarettes, even bread. Tea, 
soap and sausages are rationed in many places. As I write these words we are awaiting 
the drastic "marketization" measures said to be drafted by a reform commission. It is 
impossible to comment on them without details not yet available.
Chaos Ahead?
But clearly the economic mess stimulates nationalist separatism, weakens the 
legitimacy of authority, and saps the self-confidence of the regime. There is real fear of 
total breakdown, of civil war, of a new "time of troubles" (the first one followed the death 
of Boris Godunov in the seventeenth century—at least this time we are unlikely to see 
Polish troops in the Kremlin!). Economic failure is widely seen as evidence of the 
bankruptcy of ideology, of the first system . S . Dzarasov (Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 2, 
1990), looking at Soviet historical experience, wrote: "How shall we see Soviet 
experience? Despite certain achievements, in the last historical analysis, the experience 
of the Soviet Union has turned out to be negative." The vast efforts of three generations, 
huge sufferings, millions of victims, have not achieved the desired level of progress. We 
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are still, as in years past, well behind the advanced countries. "We will soon see if, at 
this late hour, it is still possible to turn the USSR into a loose confederation of sovereign 
republics, operating within a common market or free-trade zone, or whether what we 
are witnessing is the end of the empire amid growing chaos.
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